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ROBIN STONE SELLERSf
I.

INTRODUCTION

THE

INCREASING AMOUNT OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST
LITIGATION' in federal courts2 has drawn public attention to
the antitrust implications of daily business transactions. 3 Of special
concern to potential defendants in private antitrust suits is the
favor with which the courts have regarded plaintiffs4 and the increas-

Associate, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York, New York. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1973; M.L.A., Harvard University, 1975; J.D., Columbia University,
1978. Member, New York Bar.
1. For a general discussion of the private antitrust suit, see E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL
TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS §§ 3.01-.08 (1965). For a discussion of the purposes
underlying the private antitrust suit, see id. § 3.01, at 10-12.
2. Private antitrust actions in federal courts increased more than threefold between 1966
and 1976. [1976] AD. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 191. The number of private antitrust
actions filed rose from 444 in 1966 to 1,416 in 1976. Id.
3. See ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 11.2, at 682 (2d ed. C. Hills 1978).
4. The Supreme Court has explained this favorable treatment of plaintiffs in private antitrust suits, stating:
[T]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action
will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no
less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further
the overriding public policy in favor of competition. A more fastidious regard for the
relative moral worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
The policy favoring private antitrust suits has been effectuated by the courts in many areas.
See, e.g., id. at 138-40 (the doctrine of in pari delicto is not a defense to a private antitrust
action); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) (antitrust plaintiff may
recover notwithstanding proof that he had engaged in an unrelated antitrust violation); Flintkote
Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957) (dollars received by plaintiff from settling defendant are subtracted from trebled damages rather than
untrebled jury verdict to avoid weakening the penal impact of the treble damage provision).
Courts have also liberalized the standing requirements in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 (1979) (consumers who purchase price-fixed goods for
personal use suffer injury to their property and have standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act);
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff need only allege
injury in fact and that the interest plaintiff seeks to protect is arguably within zone of interests
to be protected by antitrust laws). See also Note, Standing To Sue in Private Antitrust Litigation: Circuits in Conflict, 10 IND. L. REV. 532 (1977). For a discussion of the Malamud case, see
Note, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 100 (1977). But see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977) (although not strictly concerned with standing, the case implies a limitation on standing
.to sue under § 4 of the Clayton Act).

(829)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 1

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 829

5
ingly substantial damages which have been awarded to them.
Private antitrust suits for treble damages, many of which have
been characterized as intentional tort actions, 6 are brought under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. 7 To recover under section 4, a plaintiff
must establish the following elements: 1) a violation of the federal
antitrust laws; 8 2) an injury to the plaintiff's business or property; 9
3) a causal relation between the violation and the injury; 10 and

5. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 897 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.

803 (1975) (damage award of $259.5 million reversed, but parties settled out of court after
petitions for certiorari were filed); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1084
(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971)
(settlement fund of over $82 million).
6. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds,
377 U.S. 13 (1964); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280
F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1968). But cf. Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 682, 693 (1978) (arguing that "[wihether a private antitrust suit sounds in tort
ought to depend on the particular nature of the violation").
Although not all antitrust offenders violate the law intentionally, most often jointly charged
co-conspirators are considered joint tortfeasors to an intentional tort. See, e.g., Solomon v.
Houston Corrogated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); Wainright v. Kraftco
Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ca. 1973); Albert Levine Assoc. v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F.
Supp. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp.
802, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1968). This observation is significant since many antitrust actions are premised upon claims of conspiracy, for which concerted activity is requisite. See, e.g., Sherman
Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 4 provides as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
8. Id. Antitrust suits are most frequently brought for violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade);
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (prohibiting monopolization or attempts to
monopolize); § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) (prohibiting anticompetitive exclusive dealing or unlawful tying arrangments); § 10 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976)
(prohibiting purchases by common carriers with interlocking directorates); § 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (prohibiting anticompetitive mergers or acquisitions); and § 2 of the
Clayton Act as amended by § I of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b), 21a (1976)
(prohibiting price discrimination). See L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST § 3, at 13 (1977).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The Supreme Court of the United States explained this second
element of the cause of action by stating:
[Flor plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, they must prove
. . . antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (emphasis supplied by
the court).
10. See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). The plaintiff's injury to his business or property must be the direct
result of the defendant's unlawful action. Id. See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326,
2331 (1979) (broad interpretation given to the requirement of injury to business or property).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss5/1

2

Sellers: Contribution in Antitrust Damage Actions

1978-1979]

ANTITRUST DAMAGE ACTIONS

4) the amount of the damages suffered." Establishing or refuting these
elements of proof with precision is often a difficult 12 and expensive
task.1 3 Consequently, pretrial settlement provides an alternative to trial
attractive to all parties. 14 Nevertheless, settlements involving fewer
than all the defendants may generate contribution problems. 15 The right
to contribution becomes an issue when nonsettling defendants, upon
losing at trial, thereafter seek to recover from settling defendants a share
16
of the plaintiff's damage award.
The body of law controlling the availability of a right to contribution in private antitrust actions is meager as well as conflicting. The
recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc. , 17 is the only case recognizing a general right to contribution in
11. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). A plaintiff in a
private treble damage action is not required to prove the amount of damages with exactness,
but a verdict may not be based upon speculation. Id.
12. See ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 3, § 11.7, at 697-98. This problem is compounded
by the fact that plaintiffs generally join as many defendants as is reasonbly possible in order to
ensure the recovery of the full amount of damages. See Paul, Contribution and Indemnification
Among Antitrust CoconspiratorsRevisited, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 67, 68 (1972).
13. For example, Berkey Photo successfully prosecuted an antitrust action against Eastman
Kodak. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in
part, rev'd and remanded in part, vacated and remanded in part, aff'd in part, [1979] 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) ([1979] 1 Trade Cas.) 62,718 (2d Cir. June 25, 1979). Berkey then sought to
recover attorneys' fees of $30 million. Berkey Photo, Inc. v, Eastman Kodak Co., [1979] 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ([1979] 1 Trade Cas.) 62,718, at 78,032 (2d Cir. June 25, 1979). The
district court awarded $5.3 million. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district
court's decision on this issue and remanded for further consideration. Id. at 78,032-33. Similarly, SCM Corporation reportedly spent $20 million to prosecute its antitrust claims against
Xerox in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978). Bernstein, The Wall
Street Lawyers Are Thriving on Change, FORTUNE, March 13, 1978, at 106.
14, A settlement usually takes the form of a pretrial stipulation in which all of the participating defendants disclaim liability. See E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 1, § 11.04, at 158. In connection with a settlement, the plaintiff generally executes a release or a covenant not to sue in favor
of the settling defendants. Id. The settlement is enforced by the court's dismissal of the action,
with or without prejudice, upon payment into the court of an agreed upon sum. Id. For a
discussion of these release agreements, see notes 92-101 and accompanying text infra.
15. Contribution allocates the financial burden of liability among joint tortfeasors, requiring
each to pay his own share of the judgment. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 310 (4th ed.

1971). Contribution is to be distinguished from indemnification which shifts the entire burden of
liability from one tortfeasor to another. Id.
16. See id. § 50, at 309. Traditionally, where a plaintiff has settled with one of several
defendants prior to trial, the amount received is deducted from the treble amount awarded by
the court at the trial of the remaining defendants. Flintkote Co. v. LyslJord, 246 F.2d 368, 398
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). This rule, however, is presently in a state of flux.
See notes 141 & 183 infra. A bill recently introduced in the Senate proposes that in price fixing
suits, where the plaintiff has settled with some defendants, the judgment against remaining
defendants should be reduced by the greatest of 1) the amount stated in the release or covenant; 2) the amount actually paid for the release or covenant; or 3) treble the actual damages
attributable to the settling defendants. See S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b), 125 CONG.
REC. S8,931 (daily ed. July 9, 1979). For the text of this bill, see note 275 infra. For a further
discussion of this proposed legislation, see notes 275-87 and accompanying text infra.
17. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
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18 Prior to Professional Beauty, three
federal district courts directly confronting the issue held that a general right to contribution is not available. 19 Only one of these cases,
Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 20 dealt
specifically with the liability of settling defendants. 21 Since Professional Beauty, three district courts have held that contribution may
not be asserted against settling codefendants. 22
In an era of huge antitrust damage awards and prolific litigation, 23 the dearth of settled authority seems inexplicable. Many defendants will be concerned about their rights and obligations in the
event that their joint tortfeasors are not amenable to conciliation. This
article examines the rights of nonsettling defendants to contribution
from settling codefendants in private antitrust actions and concludes
that a right to contribution should not be available in such cases. An
analysis of the propriety of a rule barring contribution in such suits
requires an examination of two basic issues. The first, discussed in
Part II, is whether federal or state law governs contribution issues.
The second, discussed in Part III, is whether a nonsettling tortfeasor
has a right to contribution under the governing law.

private antitrust damage suits.

18. Id. at 1186. See notes 146-83 and accompanying text infra.
19. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 61,698, at 72,861 (D.
Utah 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1977) (oral argument held March
16, 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977] 1 Trade Cas. 61,533, at 72,112 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 134346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See notes 122-45 and accompanying text infra. Additionally, two courts
have stated in dicta that contribution should not be permitted. Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett,
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671, 678 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded in part on other
grounds, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert,
276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960). But cf. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234
F.2d 616, 619 (4th Cir. 1956) (dictum) (contribution should be permitted under Maryland law).
20. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
21. Id. at 1340-41. It should be noted that many cases involving the right to contribution
have involved a named defendant who seeks to implead an alleged co-conspirator who had not
been joined in the original action. See, e.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1181, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., [1977] 2
Trade Cas. 61,698, at 72,861 (D. Utah 1977); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977] 1
Trade Cas.
61,533, at 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
22. Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc., [19791 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
([1979] 1 Trade Cas.) 62,717, at 77,993 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 1979); In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation, [19791 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ([1979] 1 Trade Cas.)
62,689, at
77,879-80 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 917 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-1 (D.D.C. May 21, 1979). For a discussion of these cases, see
notes 184-206 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss5/1

4

Sellers: Contribution in Antitrust Damage Actions

1978-1979]

ANTITRUST DAMAGE ACTIONS

II. CHOICE OF LAW

A.

Should Federal or State Law Apply?

Neither case law, 2 4 nor the Constitution, 25 nor the antitrust statutes 26 clearly resolve whether state or federal law should control
contribution questions in antitrust actions. 27 Generally, the supremacy clause of' the Constitution 28 mandates that federal law govern
claims arising under the Constitution, federal statutes, and
treaties. 29 Where, however, the claims asserted do not depend
upon an issue of federal law, the Rules of Decision Act 30 provides
that state law should apply,. 31
Two factors arguably indicate the applicability of state law to antitrust contribution questions. First, contribution outside of the antitrust context, as a matter of substantive tort law, has traditionalh'
been governed by state statute.3 2 Second, the federal antitrust stat-

24. For a discussion of case law examining choice of law in the area of antitrust contribution,
see notes 47-89 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text infra.
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1976).
27. For a general discussion of choice of law, see Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules
for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HAnv. L.
REV. 1512 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Federal Common Law]; Note, The Competence of Federal
Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Court Competence].
For a discussion of choice of law problems in the antitrust contribution context, see Corbett, Appointment of Damages and Contribution Among Coconspirators in Antitrust Treble
Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 119-28 (1962).
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
29. Id. The supremacy clause provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.

30. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
31. Id.The Rules of Decision Act provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions inthe courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply." Id.
32. See, e.g., Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967, 972 (3d Cir. 1950), aff'd sub non.
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (inan action brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the court stated that "[c]ontribution is a.right arising under the substantive law
o(the States"); White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., 225 F. Supp. 940, 942 (D.N.D. 1964) (whether
a codefendant in a personal injury action has a substantive right to contribution or indemnity
depends upon the substantive law of the state); Blunt v. Brown, 225 F. Supp. 326, 328 (S.D.
Iowa 1963) (state law controls contribution issues in a personal injury action). Cf Rhodes v.
Barnett, 117 F. Supp. 312, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (dictum) (the right to contribution in a tort
action is a substantive issue governed by state law). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LA\Vs § 172 (1971).
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utes contain no explicit provisions concerning contribution; 33 the absence of such a provision, it can be argued, not only suggests a congressional intent to exclude contribution from the purview of federal
law, 34 but also seems to invoke the application of the Rules of Decision Act.

On the other hand, where an action brought under a federal statute involves an issue not specifically controlled by federal statutory
language, 35 strong policy considerations override the factors favoring
state law and justify applying federal law to such an issue. 36 One
such policy argument mandating the choice of federal law rests upon
the federal statutory dominance in the antitrust area.3 7

Federal stat-

33. A review of the antitrust laws reveals no provision addressing the issue of contribution.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1976).
34. It is interesting to compare antitrust contribution with contribution in the securities
area. Both antitrust and securities law are governed by federal statutes; yet Congress expressly
provided for contribution in the securities area but it was silent on the issue in the antitrust
statutes. See Securities Act of 1933, § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, §§ 9(e), 18(b), 15 U.S.C. 9§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1976). See also McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.
Supp. 1251, 1265-68 (D. Del. 1978); Liggett & Myers Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044,
1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Servs., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd inpart per curiam, 422 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 941
(1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968). This
omission in the antitrust laws suggests that Congress did not intend for federal law to govern
antitrust contribution or else it would have expressly so provided. Cf. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966). InHoosier, the Supreme Court determined that the application of a
state statute of limitations to actions brought pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976), was justified by congressional silence. 383 U.S. at 70304. The Court observed that when Congress disagrees with judicial interpretations of its silence,
it will enact federal legislation to supersede those interpretations. Id. at 704. For example, the
Court noted that in 1955 Congress enacted a federal antitrust statutue of limitations after having
found the application of state statutes of limitations to private antitrust damage actions inadequate. Id.
35. Federal law has been described as "generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies
a legal field completely .... Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted
on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives." P. BATOR, P. MISKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H.
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71
(2d ed. 1973).
36. See Federal Common Law, supra note 27, at 1519-26; Federal Court Competence, supra
note 27, at 1089-94. For a discussion of these policy factors, see notes 37-46 and accompanying
text infra.
37. See Mishkin, supra note 27, at 799-801, As Professor Mishkin has stated:
At the very least, effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal
courts to (eclare, as a matter of common law or "judicial legislation," rules which may be
necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in
the large by Congress. In other words, it must mean recognition of federal judicial competence to declare the governing law in an area comprising issues substantially related to
an established program of government operation.
Id.at 800 (footnote omitted).
In areas other than antitrust law, federal courts have applied federal common law where a
federal statute dealt with the area as a whole but did not contain a provision governing a
particular issue. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)
(federal common law applied to collective bargaining agreements to promote uniformity where
statute is silent); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296 (1941) (federal law
governs the deternination of damages for delayed payment of a contractual obligation of the
WECHSLER,
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utes govern antitrust law; 38 federal courts have exclusive federal
39
question jurisdiction over cases arising under these statutes.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts the
competence of a federal court to extend federal antitrust law to related areas not specifically covered by statutory language. 40 Since
the contribution issue arises as a result of a violation of the federal
antitrust laws, federal law appears applicable.
Another policy supporting the application of federal law to antitrust contribution is the importance of uniformity to the effectuation
of a legislative program, 41 such as the federally-created and
federally-enforced antitrust statutes. 42 A threefold rationale underUnited States notwithstanding the absence of a pertinent provision in the Internal Revenue
Code); Board'of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-52 (1939) (federal law
governs Indian rights derived from a treaty pertaining to tax payments on Indian land); O'Brien
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541 (lst Cir. 1940) (federal law controls when defamatory matter is transmitted by interstate telegraphic messages because of federal statutory
dominance in the area of communications regulations). But see UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1966) (state statute of limitations applied in an action based upon collective bargaining contract since uniformity among statutes of limitations is not necessary to further
the goals of labor policy).
38. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, § 3, at 13-14.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). For the text of this section, see note 7 supra. See also 28
U.S.C. § 1337 (1976). Section 1337 of the Judicial Code provides that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress
regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies." Id.
See also Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1963) (federal courts' jurisdiction under § 4 of the Clayton Act is exclusive); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp.,
27 F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Del.), affd, 110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 639
(1940) (exclusive jurisdiction ensures uniformity).
40. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). In Sola Electric, a patent
licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity of the patent when the license violated
the antitrust laws, notwithstanding the fact that the federal antitrust statutes did not deal with
this issue. Id. at 176. The Supreme Court reasoned that
[w]hen a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of the legal
consequences of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination,
are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted.
Id. See also Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (Sola
Electric rationale applied in determining that a release in a private antitrust suit is governed by
federal law, notwithstanding the absence of a pertinent provision in the antitrust laws).
41. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975). In Kohr, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit chose to apply federal
rather than state law in determining whether indemnity and contribution should be allowed
among the defendants in an action arising from a mid-air collision, solely because of the "predominant indeed almost exclusive" federal interest in uniform air regulation. Id. at 403. See also
Federal Common Law, supra note 27, at 1529-31.
42. The Ninth Circuit has noted that successful effectuation of antitrust policy in the context
of releases depends upon uniformity, stating,:
Whether state or federal law should govern the question posed by this appeal must be
made dependent upon considerations of public policy which transcend any static theories
of law.
In the present matter we are concerned with rights created under federal law. We
are concerned with a federal statute which seeks to regulate business conduct that affects
commerce crossing state lines. Allegations of proscribed conduct under the antitrust laws
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lies this emphasis upon uniformity: 1) the equitable interest in assur-

ing consistent interpretations of federal rights, regardless of the state
in which the federal court sits; 43 2) the administrative convenience to

.the federal government in administering one rather than fifty disparate rules; 44 and 3) the avoidance of forum-shopping and prolonged
litigation involving complex choice of state law questions. 45 Thus,
although the antitrust statutes do not specifically cover contribution,
policy dictates that a uniform federal common law should govern antitrust contribution in order to foster the swift and efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws. 46
B. Antitrust Case Law
Professional Beauty 47 and the prior antitrust contribution cases,
Sabre Shipping, 48 El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 49 and Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., 50 do not squarely address the
choice of law question, although all four cases assume that federal law
controls the issue of contribution. 51 Of the three cases dealing with
most frequently involve charges of illegal activities transcending state, regional, and even
national boundary lines.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Winchester Drive-In Theatre, 351 F.2d 925, 928 (9th
Cir. 1965). See also Miami Parts & Spring, Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 402 F.2d 83 (5th
Cir. 1968); Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Co., 259 F. Supp. 358 (D.S.C. 1966); Dale Hilton,
Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
43. See Federal Common Law, supra note 27, at 1529. For example, in Jerome v. United
States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943), the Court supported a uniform federal law interpretation of the
word "felony" in the Federal Bank Robbery Act. Id. at 104-05.
44. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (federal law governs
issues arising in connection with the federal function of making and handling commercial paper,
partly because commercial paper must be issued on a vast scale and transactions concerning the
paper can occur in several states).
45. See Note, Federal Law Held to Govern Effect of the Release of a Joint Tortfeasor in
Private Antitrust Suit, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1282, 1284 (1965).
46. See Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Del.), aff'd,
110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940). The court noted that:
An action to recover triple damages under the federal antitrust laws is based upon a
federal statute and enforceable only in a federal court. A federal court has the power to
determine the nature of the action .... If state courts determine the nature of the action,
we might have . . . the antitrust laws . . . depend upon the particular district court in
which action was brought. The interpretation of a federal statute is federal business. Federal decisions construing an Act of Congress must be exclusive and uniform.
Id. (citation omitted).
47. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
48. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
49. [1977] 1 Trade Cas.
61,533, at 72,110 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See note 19 and accompanying
text supra.
50. [1977] 2 Trade Cas.
61,698, at 72,860 (D. Utah 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2068
(10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1977) (oral argument held March 16, 1979). See note 19 and accompanying
text supra.
51. See 594 F.2d at 1182-86; [1977] 2 Trade Cas.
61,698, at 72,861; [19771 1 Trade Cas.
61,533, at 72,111-12; 298 F. Supp. at 1343-44. For a discussion of the federal substantive law
applied in these cases, see notes 122-45 and accompanying text infra.
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antitrust combination decided after Professional Beauty, none even
mentions the choice of law issue. 52 Sabre Shipping and El Camino
Glass do, however, provide some insight.
In Sabre Shipping, the first case assuming federal law to govern
the contribution question, the rights of nonsettling defendants were
directly at issue. 53 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York applied federal common law to deny the
contribution claim of nonsettling defendants. 5 4 The principal litigation focused upon a claim by Sabre Shipping Corporation (Sabre) that
the defendant shippers conspired to drive it out of business by
monopolizing the market. 55 Twenty-five defendants settled with
Sabre and obtained from it a dismissal without prejudice and covenant not to sue. 5 6 Subsequently, five nonsettling defendants impleaded seventeen of the settlors as third-party defendants for contribution and indemnification. 57 In denying the contribution claim,
the court stated that since the antitrust claims asserted were "federally created by Congressional enactment . .. we must apply federal

law to determine the rights of the parties." 5 8 The court reasoned
that "[c]ertainly the respective rights of the antitrust defendants
among themselves are questions touching upon the extent and nature
of the legal consequences of the condemned acts, involving decision
of a federal, not a state, question." 59 Nevertheless, since all the

52. See cases cited note 22 supra. For a discussion of the post-ProfessionalBeauty cases, see
notes 184-206 and accompanying text infra.
53. 298 F. Supp. at 1343. For a very good, although somewhat dated, analysis of Sabre
Shipping, see Paul, supra note 12, at 69-77.
The contribution rights of a joint tortfeasor who has settled in good faith are being considered for the first time at the circuit court level in Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Spencer Foods,
Inc., No. 78-3346 (5th Cir., oral argument held June 19, 1979), and in Wilson P. Abraham Constr.
Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., No. 78-1788 (5th Cir., oral argument held Dec. 5, 1978).
54. 298 F. Supp. at 1343.
55. 285 F. Supp. 949, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969). The plaintiff brought suit
under § 4 of the Clayton Act to recover damages for violations of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 285 F. Supp. at 950. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired unreasonably to
restrain and monopolize the Hong Kong-United States and Japan-United States trading markets
by charging unreasonably low rates, thereby forcing the plaintiff into bankruptcy. Id.
56. Id. at 950-51.
57. 298 F. Supp. at 1341. The nonsettling defendants claimed that if the alleged illegal acts
were found to have been committed, they were the joint acts of all of the defendants. Id.
Therefore it was argued that if Sabre recovered against the nonsettling defendants, then as a
necessary consequence the settling defendants would also be liable to Sabre. Id.
58. Id. at 1343.
59. Id. In making its determination that federal law should apply, the court also relied upon
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). 298 F. Supp. at 1343. For a discussion of Sola Electric, see note 40 supra.
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parties agreed that federal law should govern, 60 the court's finding
6
was merely dictum. '
Sabre Shipping cited Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 62 an earlier antitrust case which also discussed in dictum the choice of law problem. 63 Contribution was not at issue in Goldlawr, where the plaintiffs charged that the defendants had monopolized the motion picture
industry, since the impleaded third-party defendants were not found
to be joint tortfeasors with the defendants. 64 However, the
Goldlawr court noted, relying upon Supreme Court contribution decisions in the maritime area, 65 that since the tort committed was "actionable solely by reason of federal law there would seem to be strong
justification for [the] contention that the tort asserted to lie in the
third party complaint is governed by federal common law with no
66
right to contribution between tortfeasors."
The court in El Camino Glass looked to Goldlawr and Sabre
Shipping to support its no-contribution rule. 67 In El Camino Glass,
the United Glass Company, which had previously been held liable for
antitrust violations, sought contribution from an alleged co-conspirator
and joint tortfeasor not a party to the original suit. 68 Before dismissing the third-party complaint and denying the contribution claim,
the court noted that "federal law governs the issue of whether there
is a right to contribution in an antitrust case." 69 The court applied

60. 298 F. Supp. at 1343.
61. The major issue under consideration in Sabre Shipping was whether there is a substantive right to contribution under federal common law. Id. at 1343-46. See notes 128-38 and
accompanying text infra.
62. 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960).
63. 298 F.2d at 1345. The Sabre Shipping court noted that Goldlawr was distinguishable
because the third party complaint in Goldlawr did not deal with a claim for contribution. Id.
See 276 F.2d at 616-17. Thus, federal law clearly covered the third party dispute. Id.
64. 276 F.2d at 616-17.
.65. Id. at 616 & n.3. The court cited the following cases: Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Ceiling & Befitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905). 276 F.2d at 616 n.3. For a discussion of choice of law in the
maritime area, see note 91 infra.
66. 276 F.2d at 616 (footnotes omitted).
67. [1977] 1 Trade Cas. 1 61,533, at 72,111 & n.I. The El Camino Glass court relied in part
upon Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976). As
in Goldlawr, contribution was not at issue in Baughman, but the court noted that "this antitrust
action is governed by federal common law under which there is no right of contribution for
intentional torts. Unlike the federal securities laws the Sherman Act contains no provisions by
which Congress has legislated an exception to the common law rule." 391 F. Supp. at 678 n.3
(citations omitted).
68. [1977] 1 Trade Cas.
61,533, at 72,111.
69. Id. at 72,111 n.I.
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federal law since the claims in the main and third-party actions arose
friom alleged violations of federal law. 71
Recent decisions have reiterated the conclusions drawn in Sabre
Shipping and El Camino Glass. In Olson Farms, an egg distributor,
who had been held liable for conspiring to fix prices, sought contribution from a co-conspirator not a party to the original action. 71 The
court denied the contribution claim, 72 stating (without citing any authority): "The court is of the opinion that under the circumstances of
this case the availability of... contribution to the plaintiff for alleged
violation of antitrust laws is governed exclusively by the Federal an7
titrust laws ....
The most recent decision assuming that federal law governs the
74
issue of contribution in an antitrust suit is Professional Beauty.
The case involved a suit by Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. (Professional), a wholesaler of beauty supplies, against National Beauty Supply, Inc. (National), also a wholesaler. 75 Professional claimed that
National's exclusive dealership in Minnesota constituted a monopoly
and violated section 2 of the Sherman Act as well as the Minnesota
antitrust laws. 76 National sought to implead La Maur, Inc. (La
Maur), the manufacturer which had granted National the exclusive
dealership, 77 maintaining that if National were found liable, it would
be entitled to contribution from La Maur. 78 The Eighth Circuit, in
considering National's claim, cited El Camino Glass and Sabre Shipping as support for its threshold observation that federal law governs
contribution in an antitrust case. 79
The only case which ever applied state law to antitrust contribution is Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 80 an opinion which has never been cited subsequently for its discussion of
this issue. The plaintiff in Zell brought two antitrust actions against

70. Id.
71. [1977] 2 Trade Cas.
61,698, at 72,860-61.
72. Id. at 72,861.
73. Id.
74. 594 F.2d at 1181.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. (d.
79. Id. at 1182. The Professional Beauty court disagreed, however, with the El Camino and
Sabre Shipping courts' conclusions that federal law permits contribution in antitrust cases. Id. at
1183. For a discussion of this split regarding the substance of federal law in the contribution
area, see notes 122-206 and accompanving text infra.
80. 234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956).
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different conspirators, one in the fedural district court in the District
of Columbia, and the other in the federal district court in Marvland. 8 ' One issue in the case was whether a dismissal of the defendants in the Maryland action constituted a release of the defendant in
the District of Columbia suit. 82 The court held that such a release
would be "an outrageous miscarriage of justice" 83 stating: "[I]t should
be remembered that Packard [the District of Columbia defendant]
has been found by the District of Columbia Court to be a coconspirator with defendants, and that, under Maryland law,
defendants would be liable for contribution to Packard as joint
tortfeasors." 4 The court's language suggests that the Maryland dismissal would cause Packard to lose its right to contribution-a right
85
which the court determined to exist by applying Maryland law.
It might be concluded from the Zell dictum that state law should
govern antitrust contribution questions. Indeed, one commentator,
preferring Zell over Goldlawr, and overlooking Sabre Shipping, did
conclude that "state law is the correct law to apply." 8 6 The Zell
court, however, cited no authority to support its application of state
law to a Sherman Act suit, which was explicitly based upon federal

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
85. Id.

at 616-17.
at 619.
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Since 1941, Maryland law has included the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT (1939 version), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 57 (1975 &
Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM LAws ANN.]. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24

(Michie 1979). Thus, the Act was in force in 1956 when Zell was decided. See 234 F.2d at 616.
For a discussion of this Act, see notes 211-18 and accompanying text infra.
It is noteworthy that the only states which currently permit contribution among intentional
tortfeasors, where the plaintiff has settled with some of the defendants prior to trial, are those
following the 1939 Act. See notes 211-12 and accompanying text infra.
86. M. MITCHELL, PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 84 (1970). Another author, Professor

Moore, believes that state law, and state conflict of law principles, should apply to contribution
questions arising in cases based upon federal question jurisdiction. See 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 14.03[3], at 14-156 to -157 n.6 (rev. 2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1978-1979). The flaws in
the analysis presented are, however, easily revealed. In discussing third-party practice under
rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Moore indicates that the rule itself
does not create a substantive right to contribution; rather, he contends that "[tihe third-party
defendant's liability to the defendant, if predicated on a contribution . . . theory, must be determined under applicable state law, even though jurisdiction in the main case is based on a
federal statute." Id. While noting that Sabre Shipping represents precedent to the contrary,
Moore cites several securities cases to support his conclusion. Id. See Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399
F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); B & B Inv. Club v.
Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Howarth, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S:D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1976). In actuality, however, these cases support the opposite rule, i.e., that federal law
governs the contribution issue. See 399 F. Supp. at 1367; 391 F. Supp. at 724-25; 378 F. Supp.
at 136. Since no antitrust case, except Zell, (which was not cited by Moore), follows what he
considers to be the proper rule, Moore's contention is not likely to be persuasive.
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question jurisdiction. 87 As one author has explained, perhaps "the
court in Zell was unconsciously following the Erie [diversity case]
rule" to apply state law. 8s Such an approach is, of course, without
basis in a federal question case. 89 It appears, therefore, that Zell's
precedential value is marginal.
In summary, the weight of authority supports the conclusion that
federal law governs antitrust contribution questions. The only case
law to the contrary, Zell, is not convincing. 9o Since, however, the
meager law in this area rests primarily upon dicta, the analogous area
of antitrust releases will be consulted to more definitively resolve this
choice of law issue. 91
The plaintiff's grant to a settling defendant of a release 92 normally precedes, and in fact, may trigger a nonsettling defendant's
contribution claim. 93 Nonetheless, the legal theories underlying releases on the one hand, and contribution on the other, are not idlentical. Contribution is founded in tort law. 94 Releases are essentially

87. 234 F.2d at 617.
88. Corbett, supra note 27, at 123.
89. See id. at 123-24.
90. For other authorities to the contrary, see note 86 supra.
91. In addition to analogous areas of law in the antitrust context, it is useful to consider how
federal courts have dealt with the contribution choice of law question in another area of exclusive federal court jurisdiction. The courts in El Camino Glass, Sabre Shipping, and Goldlawr
relied upon Supreme Court maritime contribution cases in their selection of federal law to
govern antitrust contribution issues. See El Camino Class v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977] 1 Trade
Cas.
61,533, at 72,111; Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F.
Supp. at 1344; Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d at 616 n.3. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether a right to contribution exists between joint tortfeasors in a non-collision maritime injury
case. Id. at 284. The Court denied Halcyon's request for contribution on the basis of federal
common law, which did not provide such a right. Id. at 285-87. The Halcyon Court specifically
noted that "Congress has already enacted much legislation in the area of maritime personal
injuries." Id. at 285 (footnote omitted). As a result of the absence of legislation on the issue of
contribution, the Court held that it would be inappropriate to fashion such a rule and that "the
solution of this problem should await congressional action." Id. Although a later case held that
Halcyon did not constitute an absolute bar against contribution in non-collision cases, that same
case also reviewed the question as one governed by federal maritime law. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111-i4 (1974). For a very good discussion of Halcyon and Cooper, see Note, supra note 6, at 687-92.
92. A release is a contractual settlement in which a claim asserted against a party is abandoned and extinguished. J. VAN KALINOWSKY, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS
§ 109.05 (1976). A covenant not to sue is a contract not to enforce an existing cause of action in
exchange for some consideration. The claim is not relinguished; it is merely not enforced. W.
PROSSER, supra note 15, § 49, at 303. Thus, the granting of a covenant not to sue has no effect
on tortfeasors who are not parties to it. ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 3, § 11.81, at 832. For

a discussion of the effect of a release, see note 98 infra. However, the decision in Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 322 (1971), made releases and covenants not to sue
functionally equivalent. See notes 97-102 and accompanying text supra.
93. See ANTITRUST ADVISOR, supra note 3, §§ 11.74 & 11.81, at 825-26 & 831-32.

94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 49, at 306.
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contractual agreements. 95 Contribution and releases are, however,
analogous in the choice of law area since, like tort actions, contract
suits have traditionally been governed by local law. 9 6 In addition,

the antitrust laws do not specifically govern either releases or contribution. Thus, a demonstration that federal law controls antitrust
releases provides a persuasive argument for federal law to govern antitrust contribution issues.
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,9 7 the Supreme Court rejected the old common law rule that a release of one
tortfeasor also releases all other joint tortfeasors, 98 holding instead

under federal law "a party releases only those other parties whom he
intends to release." 99 The Zenith Court based its conclusion that
federal law controls issues concerning antitrust releases 100 upon the

95. See note 92 supra.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188, at 575 (1971).
97. 401 U.S. 322 (1971).
98. See, e.g., Solar Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 156 F. Supp. 51, 58 (W.D. Pa. 1957);
Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 921, 922
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
In Zenith, the Supreme Court reviewed three rules previously developed "to deal with the
question of whether the release of one joint tortfeasor releases other tortfeasors who are not
parties to or named in the release." Id. at 343. The rules are as follows: 1)The "ancient common law rule," that "a release of one joint tortfeasor released all other parties jointly liable,
regardless of the intent of the parties"; 2) a rule adopted by statute in 21 states, by judicial
decision in several others, and the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 885(1) (1939), that "although a release of one coconspirator normally releases all others, it will not have such an effect
if a plaintiff expressly reserves this right against the others"; 3) the rule set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 885(1) (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970), which states that "the
effect of a release upon coconspirators shall be determined in accordance with the intentions of
the parties." 401 U.S. at 343-45. The Zenith Court followed the third rule, which it had recently applied in a patent infringement case, Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S.
476 (1964). 401 U.S. at 346.
99. 401 U.S. at 347.
100. Id. at 346-47. Since Zenith, federal courts have interpreted the effect of a release of one
tortfeasor on the remaining joint tortfeasors in accordance with federal common law. See, e.g.,
Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Wiederhold v.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 368 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ind. 1974). In Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1975), however, the Third Circuit applied state law to resolve
a dispute concerning the meaning of a general release in an antitrust suit. Id. at 892. Since the
release in question was on its face applicable to all disputes between the parties, the court chose
to apply state law because it would be anomolous to interpret the release according to federal
common law in the antitrust action, when the same language would be interpreted according to
state law in a tort action between the parties. Id. at 891. In choosing to apply state law, the
court emphasized that a federal court could competently have applied federal common law to
the question. Id. at 888-89. The court distinguished Zenith from the case before it on the
ground that Zenith involved the effect of a release on tortfeasors who were not parties to it and
who held multi-state residency, while Three Rivers raised a simple question of interpretating a
contract in a dispute solely between parties to that contract. Id. at 888-92. The Three Rivers
court also provided a caveat to its application of Pennsylvania law, stating: "A federal court
would still be permitted . . . to reject the rule of a particular state whose doctrine . . . is not
entirely consistent with federal antitrust objectives." Id. at 892. Thus, the Three Rivers decision
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necessity of maintaining uniform rules in private antitrust litigation. 101 Similarly, the effectuation of the antitrust laws demands that
a uniform federal law govern antitrust contribution. 102 Therefore, if
antitrust releases, traditionally an aspect of state contract law, are
subject to federal law, contribution in the antitrust area should also
be governed by federal law.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTION LAW

A.

Sources of Federal Common Law

Assuming a court has concluded that federal law governs the resolution of antitrust contribution questions, it must then determine
what the federal law is. A federal court may look to three sources to
choose the appropriate substantive rule to govern antitrust contribution. 103 First, a federal court may select the traditional federal
common law rule which prohibits contribution. 104 Second, a federal
court may adopt the contribution law of the appropriate state, 105 in
does not undermine the contention that federal law governs antitrust contribution claims.
Moreover, in Goldlawr, the Third Circuit recognized the applicability of federal law to contribution issues. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit did not discredit its Goldlawr dictum in Three Rivers.
101. 401 U.S. at 346-47. The Supreme Court in Zenith stated:
We must keep in mind the multistate and multiparty character of much private antitrust
litigation; often, defendants who have conspired together may be sued in a number of
different States if all are to be reached, and, while defendants in some States may be
willing to enter into settlements, defendants in others may not. To adopt the ancient
common-law rule would frustrate such partial settlements, and thereby promote litigation ....
[and] create a trap for unwary plaintiffs' attorneys.
Id.
102. For a discussion of the importance of a uniform interpretation and application of federal
statutes, see notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
103. For articles discussing the competence of federal courts to apply varying substantive
rules, see note 27 supra. The sources to which a federal court will look in fashioning a substantive rule will necessarily vary with the issue. See Hill, supra note 27, at 1080.
104. See notes 123-145 and accompanying text infra.
105. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-04 (1966); Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1946). Cf Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (the Court noted that it had sometimes selected state law as a
source). In the antitrust area, for example, there was no federal statute of limitations for private
damage actions prior to 1955, and federal courts applied state rules. See Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906). The federal courts also
applied state court interpretations of those rules. See Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
177 F. Supp. 88, 90-91 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1960); Leonia Amusement
Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 756-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In 1955, Congress amended
the Clayton Act to impose a four-year statute of limitations on treble damage actions. See 15
U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
As to which state's law is appropriate, it should be noted that "where a federal interest
underlies an application of state law, the selection of the appropriate state is a matter of federal
choice of law." Federal Court Competence, supra note 27, at 1099. See also Note, Applicability
of State Conflicts Rules When Issues of State Law Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1212 (1955).
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which case the state rule would operate not by its own force but by
its adoption into federal law. 116 Third, a court may fashion a new
federal common law rule 117 which would reflect state law trends, 108
or analogous federal statutory patterns. 109
The few antitrust contribution cases provide little guidance as to
why the courts applied a particular rule and, thus, give little assurance of the direction they might later take. 110 Furthermore, the recent Eighth Circuit decision in Professional Beauty, which broke with
the traditional federal rule, "' has intensified the uncertainty. Consequently, in the future, a federal court confronted with the problem
of determining the contribution rights of a nonsettling defendant112
may wish to undertake a fresh analysis of the issue, and would profit

106. Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 177 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1959), affd, 274
F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1960). See also Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
107. For a comprehensive discussion of the competence of federal courts to fashion new
common law rules, see Hill, supra note 27; Mishkin, supra note 27, at 810-34.
108. See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Snpp. at 1343 n.1,
1346 (noting the trend in state law in favor of contribution).
109. For example, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court fashioned a new federal common law right to bring a wrongful death action, thereby
replacing an old common law maritime rule to the contrary. Id. at 389-93. In reaching this
decision, the Court relied substantially upon Congress' creation of wrongful death actions in
other federally-regulated areas. Id.
110. See notes 127-206 and accompanying text infra.
111. See 594 F.2d at 1182-83, 1186; notes 146-83 and accompanying text infra.
112. When an antitrust plaintiff settles with fewer than all the defendants prior to trial, the
question often arises as to whether the plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the action as to the
settling defendants. E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 1, § 9.07, at 118. The nonsettling defendants
usually object to the dismissal for fear of loss of right to contribution. Id. The nonsettling
defendants, however, have generally been unsuccessful. Id.
Under rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss
an action in one of three ways. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a). First, a plaintiff has an absolute right to
dismiss by filing notice of dismissal before the adverse party answers or moves for summary
judgment. Id. at 41(a)(1)(i). Second, a plaintiff may dismiss by filing a stipulation signed by all
parties who have appeared. Id. at 41(a)(1)(ii). Third, the court may order a dismissal at the
plaintiff's insistence upon such terms and circumstances as it deems proper. Id. at 41(a)(2).
Since rule 41(a) does not specifically define dismissal of an "action," it is not clear from the
rule whether an action may be dismissed as to fewer than all the defendants involved. In the
antitrust area, it has been held that "action" under rule 41(a) can mean not only all claims
asserted against all defendants, but also all claims asserted against any one defendant. Southern
Elec. Generating Co. v. Allen Bradley Co., 30 F.R.D. 135, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Hence, a
voluntary dismissal against fewer than all of the severally named defendants is proper if the
court determines that such a dismissal would not violate any of the remaining defendants' legal
rights. Id. See also Broadway, & Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 23 F.R.D. 9, 11
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 490, 494 (N.D.
I11.1953). In Sabre Shipping, the court permitted the dismissal of fewer than all the defendants,
stating that "even though the plaintiff had originally sued all defendants as joint tortfeasors, it
had the absolute right to settle with some of them and covenant not to continue its suit against
them, while reserving its right to continue against the non-settling defendants." Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. at 1346.
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from an examination of the various substantive rules 113 and their policy underpinnings.
The traditional federal common law rule prohibiting contribution,
and the recently fashioned Professional Beauty rule permitting contribution, will be examined first. 114 The next section analyzes the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 (1939 Act), 115
116
which provides a right of contribution to nonsettling defendants.
Then, the 1939 Act will be compared to the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955 (1955 Act), 117 the Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1977, 118 and the contribution law of New York 119
all of which exclude a right to contribution after settlement and
release. 120 The final section summarizes and evaluates the proposals
concerning contribution and settlement in Senate Bill 1468, presently
pending in Congress. 121
B. Federal Common Law
1. Case Law Before Professional Beauty
Under English common law, contribution was not permitted between intentional joint tortfeasors. 122 American federal courts later
extended this rule to encompass all tortfeasors, thereby obliterating
the distinction between intentional and unintentional wrongdoers. 123 In the antitrust contribution area, the courts in Olson

113. One court has commented: "[Contribution] is a field of the law totally lacking in uniformity." Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tenn. 1976).
114. See notes 122-206 and accompanying text infra.
115. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1-12 (1939 version), reprinted
in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 57-59 (1975).
116. UNIFORM CONTRI3UTION AMoNc TORTFEASORS ACT § 2 (1939 version), reprinted in 12
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 57-59. See notes 211-18 and accompanying text infra.
117. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONc TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1-9 (1955 rev. version), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 63-107 (1975). See notes 219-34 and accompanying text

infra.

118.

UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §9

1-4, reprinted in 12

UNIFORM LAWS ANN.

27-35 (Supp. 1979). See notes 235-71 and accompanying text infra.
119. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW 9§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 9
15-101 to -109 (McKinney 1978).
120. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT ,l(d) (1955 rev. version), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 63; UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4(b), reprinted

in 12

UNIFORM LAWS ANN.

32 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. Civ.

PRAC. LAw §

1401 (McKinney 1976).

121. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). For the text of S. 1468, see note 275 infra.
122. Merrvweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See generally Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 176 (1898).
123. See, e.g., Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285
(1952); Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 228 (1905). See W.
PROSSER, supra note 15, § 50, at 306; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 102 (1937).
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Farms,1 24 El Camino Glass, 1 25 and Goldlawr126 joined in Sabre
Shipping's conclusion that there is "no reported case in which contribution was permitted under federal common law for intentional
torts."127 Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass are the only decisions presenting extensive discussions of a federal common law rule
barring contribution.
The Sabre Shipping court relied upon decisions in analogous
areas of securities and maritime law in denying the cofitribution
claim. 12 For example, the court discussed Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp., 129 an admiralty case in which the
Supreme Court refused to fashion a new rule of contribution. 1" The
Sabre Shipping court found this significant in light of the Halcyon
Court's exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, an area where a court is
relatively free to fashion new rules. 1 3 1 The Sabre Shipping court also
looked to securities law, noting that Congress' failure to provide for
contribution in the antitrust statutes, when compared with the
explicit statutory provisions for contribution in the securities area,
manifests a congressional intent to exclude a right of contribution in
13 2
an antitrust suit.
The court next noted two policy considerations which justified
the denial of the contribution claim. 133 First, in the court's view, a
contribution rule would discourage private actions, 134 which have
proven to be particularly important in deterring antitrust violations, 135 since potential plaintiffs would fear losing control over their
lawsuits with the introduction of third-party actions. 136 Second, the

124. [1977] 2 Trade Cas. 1 61,698, at 72,861.
125. [1977] 1 Trade Cas.
126. 276 F.2d at 616.

61,533, at 72,111-12.

127. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. at 1343.
128. Id. at 1344-46.
129. 342 U.S. 282 (1952). For a discussion of Halcyon in the choice of law context, see note
91 supra.
130. 342 U.S. at 285.
131. 298 F. Supp. at 1344.
132. 298 F. Supp. at 1345. For a discussion of contribution in the securities area, see note 34
supra.

133. 298 F. Supp. at 1346.
134. Id.
135. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
136. Id. The court stated that
[i]f one or two defe4idants sued by a plaintiff. . . could turn around and implead all other
persons directly and indirectly involved in the alleged conspiracy, it could well spell
death to the plaintiff's suit and thus thwart the statutory purpose. Plaintiff's choice to sue
those of the defendants it considers most culpable or most capable of making him whole
would be totally nullified, and control of his action would be taken out of his hands.
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court showed great concern that contribution would discourage settlement. 137 The court reasoned that if a settling defendant would
remain liable to nonsettling defendants for contribution, settlement
would lose that characteristic most meaningful to settlors: final and
complete termination of their involvement in the case. 138
El Camino Glass adhered to Sabre Shipping's no-contribution
rule. 139 Although noting that "considerations of equity and fairness
• . . underly the modern trend towards permitting contribution in
cases of unintentional torts,"140 and that a court could create a
rule protecting both settling and nonsettling defendants,' 4 ' the El
Camino Glass court, nonetheless, denied the contribution claim. 142
The court explained that contribution was undesirable in the antitrust
area for two reasons: first, it would interfere with a plaintiff's ability
to control the litigation by choosing who should be joined as parties; 143 and second, a right to contribution would decrease the deterrent effect of the private treble damage action since a prospective
violator would not risk liability for more than his share of the total

137. 1d.
138. Id.
139. [1977] 1 Trade Cas. 61,533, at 72,112. The third-party plaintiff claimed that its joint
tortfeasors were liable for contribution for unintentional violations of the antitrust laws, presumably to avoid the traditional common law rule barring contribution among intentional
tortfeasors. Id. For a discussion of the federal no-contribution rule, see notes 122-206 and accompanying text. The court, however, found intent irrelevant in its contribution discussion. [1977] 1 Trade Cas.
61,533, at 72,112. The reasoning in El Carino Glass is therefore
applicable to the discussion of the contribution rights of settling intentional tortfeasors. See id.
at 72,111 n.2.
140. Id.
141. Id. In support of this proposition, the court referred to the case of Comes v. Brodhurst,
394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968). [1977] 1 Trade Cas.
61,533, at 72,112. Gomes, a negligence
action, held that a covenant not to sue given by the plaintiff to a settling defendant barred an
action for contribution against that settling defendant by a nonsettling codefendant in order to
encourage settlement. 394 F.2d at 467-68. The court posited that if contribution were to be
permitted in such a situation, '[n]ot only would a joint tortfeasor defendant be stripped of an
incentive to settle but he would have a positive incentive to stand trial and actively participate
in his defense in order to minimize his liability." Id. at 468. In determining the amount owed
the plaintiff by the nonsettling defendant, Gomes rejected both the rule which substracts the
settlement amount from the verdict, and the pro rata reduction rule based on the number of
tortfeasors. Id. See note 183 infra. Instead, to protect the nonsettling defendant, the court
applied a rule of "comparative negligence" or equitable apportionment. Id. at 468-69.
142. [19771 1 Trade Cas. 1 61,533, at 72,112.
143. Id. Thus, a plaintiff's suit might be prolonged by defendant's motions to implead others
for contribution, as well as by the presentation of evidence solely related to that claim. A
possible response to this reasoning is that rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits a court to order a separate trial of a third-party claim when it would avoid prejudice or
further the interests of convenience or economy. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Nevertheless, the
existence of this discretionary power did not impress the El Camino Glass court as sufficient
protection for antitrust plaintiffs, for the court stated: "'Severance of the third party complaint is
an uncertain and inadequate remedy." [19771 1 Trade Cas.
61,533, at 72,112.
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damage. 144 Thus, the court held that no right to contribution should
145
be permitted in private antitrust actions.
2.

The Professional Beauty Decision

Professional Beauty fashioned new law in rejecting the traditional
federal common law rule prohibiting contribution, and held "that
sound policy reasons dictate ... that under certain circumstances an
antitrust defendant may be entitled to pro rata contribution from
other joint tortfeasors."146 The Professional Beauty court granted
the third-party contribution claim, feeling free to make a new rule
notwithstanding the uniform prior decisions upholding the traditional
common law. The court first discussed and distinguished prior
cases, 147 and then disposed of five arguments supporting a nocontribution rule. 148 A review and analysis of how the court handled
each of these arguments follows.
First, Judge Stephenson dismissed the argument that congressional inaction in the antitrust contribution area implied that Congress intended there should be no right to contribution. 149 The
court weakly suggested that the antitrust statutes did not purport to
be comprehensive and that the dearth of case law on antitrust contribution had been unlikely to spur congressional action. 150 The dissent, however, joined El Caiino Glass 151 and Sabre Shipping, 152
finding legislative silence particularly significant in view of ample
statutory precedent in other federal law areas. 153

144. [1977] 1 Trade Cas.
145. Id.

61,533, at 72,112.

146. 594 F.2d at 1182 (footnotes omitted).

147. Id. at 1182-83. Recognizing that Sabre Shipping was the lead case against contribution,
the court focused most of its criticism upon it. Id. at 1183. The Professional Beauty court
criticized what it felt to be Sabre Shipping's misplaced reliance on Halcyon, arguing that since

Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974), overturned Halcyon and granted a
right to contribution, this indicates that "under certain circumstances the Supreme Court is
willing to fashion a rule allowing contribution without express direction from Congress." Id.
Such reasoning is, however, imprecise because it overlooks the following crucial factors: 1)
courts have greater freedom to fashion new law in the maritime area than in the antitrust area;

2) Sabre Shipping looked to Halycon for at most analogous law; and 3) Sabre Shipping's holding
was otherwise supported with cases and policy. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra;
note 91 supra.

148. 594 F.2d at 1183-85.
149. Id. at 1183-84.
150. Id.
151. See notes 139-44 and accompanying text supra.
152. See notes 128-38 and accompanying text supra. The Sabre Shipping court stated: "Congress, aware of the rule against contribution, saw fit to provide for it explicitly in the securities
statutes but not in the enforcement of antitrust laws which dominate so much of our litigation,
and . .. no such right should be implied." 298 F. Supp. at 1345.
153. 594 F.2d at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
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Second, the majority recognized that third-party litigation could
destroy the plaintiff's control over his lawsuit, 154 and inhibit future
private attorney general actions. 155 The court quickly passed over
this fear, however, in light of the fact that Professional, the plaintiff,
did not object to the third-party suit. 156 The Professional Beauty
court failed to fully appreciate that the addition of new parties not
only fundamentally alters the nature of an action, but also increases
the cost of the suit and complicates the issues. The majority felt that
the problem could be ameliorated by the district court's power of
severence, 157 an alternative not appealing to a plaintiff wary of relying upon a court's discretionary protective instincts. 158
Third, with alarming brevity, the Professional Beauty court
stated that contribution would not undermine the antitrust and judicial policy encouraging settlement. 159 The court appears to have ignored the probability that a joint tortfeasor would refuse to settle if
any benefit derived could be obliterated by its being forced to contribute to an enormous verdict. Particularly in the case of small defendants which are relatively powerless to negotiate favorable settlements, the right to contribution would encourage such defendants to
litigate the case, and then seek contribution from codefendants if unsuccessful. 160
The court's scanty analysis of the settlement issue is problematic
since the case did not involve settling tortfeasors. The court recog61
nized that the settling tortfeasor presents unique questions.'

154. Id. at 1184.

155. Id. The dissent agreed, stating:
To a substantial extent, the enforcement of antitrust policy depends on the attrac-

tiveness of litigation to private attorneys general. . . . Before formulating a rule which
permits additional parties and issues to be joined in an antitrust case, we should be sure
that we do not thereby counterbalance the motivation to sue provided by the treble
damage award.
Id. at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 1184.
157. Id.
158. For a similar observation by the El Camino Glass court, see note 143 supra.
159. 594 F.2d at 1184.
160. Contribution-Fairnessor Folly in Antitrust Litigation, 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) at B-i to -6 (June 7, 1979).
161. 594 F.2d at 1184. The court briefly acknowledged the settlement problem when it
stated: "The problem of how to treat a joint tortfeasor who has settled in good faith is not
present in this case. However, in the proper case the court should be able to fashion a rule of
contribution which will protect the rights of settling defendants." Id., citing Gomes v.
Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468-70 (3d Cir. 1968) (other citations omitted). For a discussion of
Gomes, see note 141 supra.
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Nevertheless, in endorsing contribution, the court did not notice its

detrimental effect on the settlement initiative. 16 2 The majority failed
to perceive what most state statutory drafters 163 and subsequent
courts 164 have found: that the best incentive for settlement and the
most protection for the settling defendant is the no-contribution rule.
Fourth, the court gave no credence to the fact that the addition
of new parties through contribution claims could create unmanageable
administrative difficulties not avoidable by severence. 165 The dissent
in Professional Beauty, on the other hand, noted "the potential for
confusion, delay and complexity" resulting from contribution. 166 Recently, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 167 the Supreme Court echoed
this concern for the growing complexity of issues in private antitrust
litigation, the effect of which "could seriously impair this important
weapon of antitrust enforcenent." 168
Lastly, the Professional Beauty court addressed the contention
that a no-contribution rule increases the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws by denying defendants the power to redistribute the cost of
an antitrust violation. 169 Noting that the deterrence argument "cuts
both ways," 170 the majority argued that without contribution an
economically powerful defendant may convince a plaintiff not to sue
it. 171 The plaintiff may not be so persuaded, the court explained, if
1 72
the defendant could redistribute its liability through contribution.
Therefore, according to the majority, contribution would deter antitrust violators by foreclosing an escape from liability. 173 The court

162. 594 F.2d at 1184.

163. For examples of this choice by state law drafters, see notes 219-34 & 252 and accompanying text infra. But see also text accompanying notes 217-18 infra.

164. See cases discussed notes 184-206 infra.
165. 594 F.2d at 1184-85.

166. Id. at 1189-90 (Hanson, J., dissenting). One commentator, agreeing with the dissent and
noting that it was written by a senior district court judge sitting by designation, opined that

Judge Hanson's strong objection to contribution may result from his closer knowledge of the
complications of trial court management than the "insulated" court of appeals judges. Brown,

Franchising-ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
167. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).

168. Id. at 745.
169. 594 F.2d at 1185.
170. Id.
171. id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court founded its argument on National's claims in its depositions that Professional was persuaded not to name La Maur as a defendant because La Maur renewed Professional's franchise. Id. For a discussion of a later case which distinguished ProfessionalBeauty on

the basis of, amnsg other reasons, this deterrence theory, see note 190 and accompanying text
infra.
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conceded, however, that a defendant's fear that he has no recourse
against codefendants may provide some deterrent to violators and, at
the same time, encourage settlement. 174
The Professional Beauty opinion sought to achieve "fairness between the parties" and "justice," which ends it felt are not served
when one tortfeasor is permitted to shoulder more than its fair share
of responsibility "because of the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer." 175 Fairness to the nonsettling defendant and the avoidance of collusion should not, however, have
176
blinded the court to its duty to redress the antitrust violation.
The majority may have understandably believed that contribution
would create a spirit of cooperation among defendants intending to
settle in private antitrust suits. Yet, once a defendant feels that settlement by codefendants will not expose it to the bulk of the damage
award (as a result of redistribution of liability through contribution),
it will no longer be inclined to settle. The Professional Beauty
dissent expresses the view of this author, that the majority opinion
presents "no compelling reason to allow contribution in antitrust
" 177
causes ....
A particularly troubling aspect of the Professional Beauty opinion
is the court's adoption of a pro rata measure of contribution, whereby
liability is determined by dividing the total judgment award by the
number of joint tortfeasors. 178 Beyond Professional Beauty, and regardless of the contribution rule adopted by a court, the problem of
measuring liability is especially acute since the exposure of the nonsettling defendant will be the measure of the settlor's share of liability
deducted from the plaintiff's total damages. The Professional Beauty
court selected the pro rata measure "[b]ecause of the administrative
difficulties of assessing exact percentages of fault in complicated antitrust actions . .. except in unusual circumstances."179 The court's

174. 594 F.2d at 1185.
175. Id. at 1185-86 (citations omitted).
176. In addition, the court's reliance on the state trend towards allowing contribution was
inaccurate. Id. at 1184 n.7. Only the ten states which have adopted the 1939 Act permit contribution among intentional tortfeasors following settlement and release. See notes 211-16 and
accompanying text infra.
177. 594 F.2d at 1188 (Hanson, J., dissenting). See also Axinn, Antitrust and Trade
Practice-Rightof Contributionfor Antitrust Defendants, N.Y.L.J., March 20, 1979, at 1, col.
1.
178. 594 F.2d at 1182 & n.4. For a general discussion of the policy rationales relating to
contribution, see Corbett, note 27 supra; Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors, 31 MONT. L. REv. 69, 77 (1969); Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 486 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Joint Tort Cases].
179. 594 F.2d at 1182 n. 4 .
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choice of such a simplistic measure appears ironic in light of its rejection of administrative difficulties as a rationale for objecting to contribution. 180 In fact, the court's major reasons for supporting contribution-fairness and equity-argue against the pro rata
measure. Surely a court which believes it can fashion a rule to protect
settling tortfeasors should also have confidence in its ability to overcome the difficulties of finding a more equitable means to assess culpability.
A more equitable method of computing liability is on the basis of
comparative fault, whereby the court determines each tortfeasor's
percentage of culpability. Although this measure is inherently fair,
especially where the damage award bears no relationship to the
benefits received by the defendants, 181 it too does not escape criticism. A settling tortfeasor who wishes to extricate himself from the
suit must remain nominally in the case (bearing the court costs and
legal fees) for purposes of apportionment.
Neither the comparative fault nor the pro rata measure will satisfactorily apply to every antitrust case, 182 and no court has, as yet,
provided a convincing argument to support a consistent choice in all
situations. Thus, if contribution were to be permitted-or, in any
event, when measuring the nonsettlor's liability exposure under a
no-contribution rule - it appears that the fairest method would be
to permit the court to determine the proper measure on a case by
case basis, in light of the complexities and equities of each case. 183

180. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
181. The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Amendment: Hearings on S. 300 Before the Subcomnm.
on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (1979) (testimony of Assist. Att. Gen. Shenefield commenting on the predecessor to
S. 1468) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings].
182. Id.at 15-16.
183. In the settlement situation, no general rule has as yet emerged to determine the amount
of the total damage judgment to be assessed against the nonsettling defendants. The traditional
rule is to subtract the amount paid by the settling defendants from the trebled damages. See
Flintkote Co. v. Lysflord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957);
note 16 supra. Another possibility is to deduct the equitably apportioned share of the settling
defendant based on comparative fault. Still another is to subtract the settlor's pro rata share.
Finally, a fourth procedure would be to deduct from the damage award the greatest of the first
three measures. The fourth manner provides some protection for the nonsettling defendants.
However, it may also cause plaintiffs to be reluctant to settle for fear of relinquishing an unknown and major part of the award for a relatively small settlement sum. See Gomes v.
Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1968); note 141 supra. The first measure provides the
greatest overall recovery for the plaintiff. The third suffers from the unfairness inherent in
simplistic numerical adjustments. The method based on comparative fault appears most equitable to this author. See Comes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d at 468-69. For a discussion of the measure
of liability in the post-ProfessionalBeauty cases, see note 195 and accompanying text infra. For
a discussion of this liability analysis under state statutes, see notes 237-38 and accompanying text
infra. See also 1979 Hearings, supra note 181, at 16-20.
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Case Law After Professional Beauty

The Professional Beauty decision has spurred considerable controversy within the antitrust bar; the contribution issue promises to
monopolize the thoughts and practices of counsel, judges, and legislators. Three recent district court opinions indicate that, at least in
cases involving settling tortfeasors, Professional Beauty will not be
followed. These decisions have unequivocally held that a nonsettling
tortfeasor has no right to contribution from a settling codefendant.
In In re Amnpicillin Antitrust Litigation, 184 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motions of a
nonsettling defendant (Bristol) to assert cross-claims for contribution
against a settling codefendant (Beecham). 185 The court believed that
contribution would undermine Beecham's incentive to settle, since
Beecham was motivated to settle by a desire to "end its participation
in this litigation."1 86 The court was also concerned that contribution
would undermine the public interest in deterring antitrust violations. 187 Professional Beauty was limited, in the court's view, to
"circumstances in which contribution might further rather than
hamper the deterrent purposes of the antitrust laws," 188 and to situations where the plaintiff did not object to the nonsettling defendant's
attempt to recover from its co-conspirator. 189 In addition, while the
Professional Beauty court observed that a no-contribution rule would
permit a powerful tortfeasor to escape liability by "exercising 'sufficient economic influence to prevent a plaintiff from including it as a
defendant,' "190 in the instant case, Beecham would not avoid liability since the settlement was negotiated in good faith and was beneficial to the plaintiffs as well as to Beecham. 19 1 Furthermore, the
plaintiffs had joined Beecham in opposing Bristol's contribution mo92
tion. 1
184. 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-1 (D.D.C. May 21, 1979). The plaintiffs

charged that Bristol and Beecham conspired to monopolize and restrict trade in ampicillin and
other semisynthetic penicillins," in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at E-1 to -2. The court stated:

With these cross-claims pending against it, Beecham would have reason to participate
fully in the defense of the case, in order to reduce any primary liability to the plaintiffs.
... Therefore, to grant the current motion to amend would cause Beecham and the
plaintiffs to lose the benefit of their settlement bargain.
Id. at E-1.

187. Id. at E-2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id., quoting Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
at 1185. For a discussion of this argument, see note 173 and accompanying text supra.
191. 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-2.

192. Id. The Ampicillin court also considered the untimeliness of Bristol's motion to be an
important factor, noting that Bristol waited almost nine years from the commencement of the
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Finally, the court denied Bristol's motion to amend its answer
insofar as it attempted to assert a new affirmative defense which
would reduce Bristol's liability due to Beecham's settlement payment. 193 Bristol apparently sought a reduction of its total exposure,
as a result of Beecham's settlement, in excess of the usual amount
derived by subtracting the settlement sum from the full amount of
the treble damages. 194 The court stated that it had the power to
make any size reduction without an amended pleading, but it did not
indicate whether it would impose a rule other than the usual subtraction of the settlement sum from the full amount of treble damages.1 95
In In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 196 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas similarly denied motions by nonsettling defendants to assert cross-claims
for contribution against settling joint tortfeasors for three reasons.
First, the court posited that allowing contribution would make "settlements impossible to achieve," 197 giving defendants "little incentive
to buy peace from plaintiffs if they may be obligated to litigate the
same claims against other defendants." 198 Second, the court felt that
contribution would exacerbate the "already notorious complexity and
unmanageability of antitrust cases," 199 since severance would only
cause wasted time in duplicative efforts without lessening administrative difficulties. 20 0 Third, the court noted that a contribution rule
would deter private plaintiffs from exercising their enforcement role
as private attorneys general. 20 1 The Corrugated Containers court
denied the contribution motions, in view of the deterrent policies of

litigation to assert its cross-claims. Id. at E-1. The court found this delay inexcusable since no

new facts had recently been discovered which were not previously available in Bristol. Id.
193. Id. at E-2.
194. Id. For a discussion of this traditional formula for establishing a nonsettling defendant's
liability exposure, see notes 16, 181-83 and accompanying text supra.
195. 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at E-2. The amount by which the nonset-

ling defendants' liability should be reduced following a settlement by a joint tortfeasor remains
unclear and will surely become an important part of the contribution debate. For a discussion of
various measures used in computing this reduction, see notes 69, 70 & 83 and accompanying
text supra, and 1979 Hearings, supra note 181, at 16-20.
196. [19791 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ([1979] 1 Trade Cas.) 62,689, at 77,878 (S.D. Tex.
May 30, 1979).
197. Id. at 77,879.
198. Id.
199. Id. The court summarized: "It seems . . . that a policy of allowing contributions would
complicate litigation procedurally, frustrate settlements, and inhibit joint defense efforts to such
an extent that this type of litigation would be virtually impossible to manage." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 77,880.
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the antitrust laws, 2 0 2 and noted that contribution has been considered
20 3
particularly unsuitable in the context of intentional torts.
Inc. ,

Most recently, in Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group,
204 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania denied a nonsettling tortfeasor's motion to amend its
answer to assert a cross-claim for contribution against settling
codefendants in a price-fixing case. 205 The court maintained, inter
alia, that it "would be futile to allow an amendment because there is
no right to contribution as against settling codefendants in antitrust
litigation." 206
C. State Law Models
In contrast with traditional federal common law, 207 many states
permit contribution in some form. Some states allow it only among
unintentional tortfeasors. 208 Others require a joint judgment against
all defendants before a claim for contribution can accrue. 209 Nearly
every state, in some way, protects from contribution the settling defendant who has been released by the plaintiff. 210

202. For lists of jurisdictions which permit contribution among intentional tortfeasors and
those which do not, see notes 208 & 211 infra.
203. [1979] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ([1979] 1 Trade Cas.) 62,689, at 77,880. The court
noted that jurisdictions allowing contribution usually restrict such recovery to unintentional
violators. Id.
204. [1979] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ([1979] 1 Trade Cas.)
62,717, at 77,993 (E.D. Pa.
June 20, 1979).
205. Id.
206. Id. The Hedges court also denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely since
the nonsettling defendants moved to amend two and one-half years after the case began and two
months after the last of its codefendants had settled. Id. For the Ampicillin court's similar
discussion of the untimeliness of the motion, see note 192 supra.
207. See notes 122-27 and accompanying text supra.
208. This more traditional position is held by those states which have enacted the 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. They are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§§ 09.16.010-.060 (1973); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-101 to -106 (Supp. 1978);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Supp. 1978); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.

ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (West Supp. 1979); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 17.210-.300 (1971); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§IB-I to -6 (1969); North Dakota, N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 32-38-01
to -04 (1976); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3101 to -3106 (Supp. 1978); and Wyoming,
WYo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (1977). For a discussion of the 1955 Act, see notes 219-34 and
accompanying text infra.
209. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875 (West 1955); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
600.2925 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 831
(West 1960); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13

(1966).
210. See notes 225-31 & 256-61 and accompanying text infra. The exceptions are the states
which permit contribution among intentional tortfeasors even after a settlement and releasethat is, those following the 1939 Act. See note 211 infra.
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1. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939
The 1939 Act, which is substantially followed in ten states, 211
does not follow the traditional federal common law; rather, it provides
a right to contribution without distinguishing between intentional and
unintentional tortfeasors. 212 The policy justifications for allowing
contribution among intentional tortfeasors were summarized by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in a fraud action, Judson v. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co. :213 "[I]f each intentional wrongdoer knew that his
conduct was exposing him to the risk of the certainty of liability in
some amount, the desired deterrent effect would be produced more
surely than if contribution among the wrongdoers is denied." 2 14 The
court concluded that the framers of the New Jersey contribution statute, in adopting in substantial part the 1939 Act, 2 15 "embraced the
creation of a right of contribution without regard to whether the tort
from which the liability arose was intentionally or unintentionally in216
flicted."
Another major feature of the 1939 Act involves the effect of releases. Section 5 provides that
[a] release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor does
not relieve him from liability to make contribution to another joint
tortfeasor unless the release is given before the right of the other
tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has ac-

211. The states which apply the 1939 Act are: Arkansas, ARK. S-rAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to
-1009 (1962); Delaware, DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 6301-6308 (1975); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. 9§
663-11 to -17 (1968); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17 (1979); Mississippi, MIss. CODE
ANN. § 85-5-5 (1973); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (West 1952); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -18 (1954); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8321 (Purdon 1979); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6 to -6-11 (1970 Supp. 1978); South
Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1967).
212. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Ac-r § 2(1) (1939 version), reprinted in
12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 57. Section 2(1) simply provides that "[t]he right of contribution exists
among joint tortfeasors." Id.
213. 17 N.J. 67, 88, 110 A.2d 24, 34 (1954) (opinion by Brennan, J.). The court maintained
that the common law rule prohibiting contribution among intentional wrongdoers was grounded
on the notion that "society's interest in the deterring of intentional wrongdoing would be better
served if wrongdoers were taught that . . . a judicial tribunal [will not] degrade itself" by
equalizing the benefits or burdens resulting from violations of morals and laws. Id.
214. Id. at 89, 110 A.2d at 34. See also Note, Contribution and Indemnity Between Joint
Tortfeasors, 45 HARV. L. REV. 354 n.28 (1931) (doubting whether contribution really has any
deterrent effect).
215. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (West 1952).
216. 17 N.J. at 89, 110 A.2d at 35. But see Cage v. New York Cent. R.R., 276 F. Supp. 778
(W.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1967). In Cage, contribution among intentional tortfeasors was denied under the Pennsylvania version of the 1939 Act. 276 F. Supp. at
791. The Cage decision, however, has been partially eroded by Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics,
Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.). Pa. 1973), which created an exception to the Cage rule in the
products liability area. Id. at 1002.
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857

crued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata
share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages
recoverable against all the other tortfeasors. 217
Section 5 was intended to prevent collusion between the plaintiff and
the released tortfeasor by refusing to permit the plaintiff "to release
one tortfeasor from his fair share of liability and mulct another instead, from motives of sympathy or spite, or because it might be
easier to collect from one than from the other .... "218 Thus, section 5 does not permit a plaintiff to use a release to discriminate
among joint tortfeasors.
In the antitrust context, since the 1939 Act permits contribution
among intentional tortfeasors, a federal court following the law of Professional Beauty might logically look to the 1939 Act as a rationale for
permitting contribution to a nonsettling defendant. However, the
handling of the settlement issue in the 1939 Act has been criticized
and modified by its authors and state legislatures in the 1955 Act.
2. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955
The 1955 Act, which has been adopted in nine states, 219 modified the 1939 Act by establishing a right to contribution for unintentional tortfeasors only. 220 Section 1 of the 1955 Act limits contribution to unintentional tortfeasors on a pro rata basis, 221 premised on
the theory that most "tort liability results from inadvertently caused

217. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 5 (1939 version), reprinted in 12
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 58. Section 5 contains a pro rata rule under which liability is calculated
by dividing the total judgment by the number of tortfeasors. Id.
218. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1955 rev. version), Commissioner's Comment, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 100 (1975).

219. See note 208 supra.
220. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1(c) (1955 rev. version), re-

printed in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 63. Section 1(c) provides: "There is no right of contribution
in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally [willfully or wantonly] caused or contributed to
the injury ..... Id.
221. Id. § 1, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 63-64. Section 1 provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where two or more persons become jointly
or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property . . . there is a right of
contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any
of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than
his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount
paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.
Id., reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 63 (1975).
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damage" rather than deliberate wrongdoing. 222 It was intended to
be an equitable rule to prevent one joint tortfeasor from paying more
than his just share of the underlying claim. 223 Section 1 thus denies contribution to willful, intentional tortfeasors because "they are
wrongdoers and hence not deserving of the aid of courts in achieving
22 4
equal or proportionate distribution of the common burden."
Section 4 also changed the 1939 Act by providing that a
tortfeasor who has received a release or a covenant not to sue is discharged from liability for contribution. 225 Section 4 provides in pertinent part:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons
liable in tort for the same injury ...
[i]t discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all
liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. 226
Section 4 reflects the drafters' intent to encourage settlement by
exempting the settling defendant from liability for contribution, even
at the risk of possible collusion between the plaintiff and the settlor
against the nonsettling defendant. 227 Dissatisfaction with section 5 of
the 1939 Act228 proved to be the chief impetus towards this revision
in the 1955 Act. 229 The 1939 Act effectively discouraged settlements
by making it impossible for one tortfeasor to extricate himself from an
action. 230 Apparently, the drafters of the 1955 Act considered the
1939 Act's inhibition of settlements to be a greater evil than collusion
between plaintiffs and settling defendants. 231 Moreover, the collusion problem is handled perfunctorily in section 4 by the imposition
of a good faith requirement. 232
The 1955 Act has never been applied to resolve antitrust contribution issues. If, however, the law of a state which has adopted the

222. Id., Commissioners' Prefatory Note, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 60 (1975).
223. Id.
224. Id. § 1(c), Commissioners' Comment, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 65 (1975).
225. Id. § 4(b), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 98 (1975).
226. Id. § 4, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 98 (1975).
227. Id. § 4(b), Commissioners' Comment, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 99 (1975).
228. For the text of this section, see text accompanying note 217 supra.
229. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4(b) (1955 rev. version),

Commissioners' Comment, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 99 (1975).
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. See id. § 4(b), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 98 (1975). See Joint Tort Cases,
supra note 178, at 492.
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1955 Act were to be applied in an antitrust action, the settling defendant would probably not be liable for contribution to the nonsettling
defendant for two reasons. First, since section 1 permits contribution
only among unintentional tortfeasors, it would not apply to most antitrust co-conspirators. 233 Second, under section 4, the settling defendant would not be liable for contribution to the nonsettling defendant if the contribution question arose after a covenant not to sue or a
release had been granted. 234
3. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act and New York Law
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act was promulgated in 1977 as
an alternative rather than a substitute to the 1955 Act; the 1955 Act
was retained for use by states not adopting the comparative fault
principle. 235 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act is, however, intended to supersede the 1955 Act in other jurisdictions. 236 Both the
1939 Act and the 1955 Act provide for pro rata contribution, which is
inappropriate in a state which apportions liability by comparative
fault. 237 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act imposes liability on
the basis of the proportionate fault of the parties involved. 238 Although no state has as yet adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act, on September 1, 1974, New York enacted a new contribution
statutory scheme 239 which embodies its important features. 240 The
New York law will now be discussed to illustrate the probable impact
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
Under early New York law, a right of contribution could arise
between joint tortfeasors only when the plaintiff made them parties to
the suit and recovered a joint judgment against them. 241 A defend-

233. See note 6 supra.
234. See notes 225-27 and accompanying text supra.

235. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, reprinted in 12
UNIFORM LAwvs ANN.

27 (Supp. 1979).

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108
(McKinney 1978).
240. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976) with UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 1-11, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAwS ANN. 26-35 (Supp. 1979).
241. Act of Mar. 28, 1928, ch. 714, § 1, 1928 N.Y. Laws 1549 (repealed 1962). See Fox v.
Western N.Y. Motor Lines, 257 N.Y. 305, 308, 178 N.E. 289, 289-90 (1931). See also
Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 14 F.R.D. 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Baidach v. Togut, 7 N.Y.2d
128, 131-32, 164 N.E.2d 373, 374-75, 196 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69-70 (1959), McFall v. Campagnie
Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 327-28, 107 N.E.2d 463, 470-71 (1952); Epstein v. National
Transp. Co., 287 N.Y. 456, 459, 40 N.E.2d 632, 633-34 (1942). For states that have joint judgment rules today, see note 209 supra.
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ant could not compel a plaintiff to make a joint torifeasor a party to
the action. 242 The plaintiff, thus, had full control over the action; if
he elected not to sue one of the wrongdoers, there could be no joint
243
judgment, and therefore no contribution claim could be asserted.
Furthermore, if a defendant claimed contribution, liability would be
2 44
determined on a pro rata basis.

The New York contribution rules were altered in 1972 by the
New York Court of Appeals decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical

Co. 2 45

Dole permitted a defendant to claim contribution against a

joint tortfeasor not joined in the original action, 2 4 6 following an adjudication of its responsibility for damage. 2 47 The Dole court held
that the apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors should be
2 48
based on their comparative degrees of culpability.
In reaction to Dole, New York enacted its current contribution
statute which codifies, transforms, and clarifies Dole. 249 Section
1401 of the New York Civil Practice Law (CPLR) eliminates the joint
judgment rule and makes contribution among joint tortfeasors available regardless of intent: 250
Except as provided in section 15-108 of the general obligation law,
two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for
the same . . . injury . . . may claim contribution among them
whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been
rendered against the person from whom a contribution is

sought. 251

242. See cases cited note 241 supra.
243. See cases cited note 241 supra.
244. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw. § 1401, Practice Commentary C1401:1 (McKinney 1976).
245. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). For a discussion of Dole, see
Farrell & Wilner, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Leading Decision-But Where? 39 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 330 (1972); Wilner & Farrell, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: The Kaleidoscopic Impact of
a Leading Case, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 457 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Impact].
246. 30 N.Y.2d at 149-50, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
247. Id. A defendant may make his claim for contribution against a cotortfeasor not joined by
the plaintiff in one of two ways: 1) he may seek to implead the cotortfeasor as a third-party
defendant to the plaintiffs action; or 2) he may wait until a judgment is entered against him and
thereafter file an independent suit for contribution against the cotortfeasor. See id. See also
N.Y. Civ. PiAc. LAW § 1403 (McKinney 1976).
248. Id. The Dole method of apportionment on a comparative basis is considered more equitable than a pro rata rule. See generally Joint Tort Cases, supra note 178.
249. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976).
250. Id. § 1401.
251. Id. For the exception created by § 15-108 of the New York General Obligations Law,
see notes 256-61 and accompanying text infra. Section 4 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
is similar to § 1401 of the CPLR. Section 4 provides:
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In discarding the joint judgment rule, the drafters thereby rejected the common law assumption underlying the no-contribution
rule "that potential tortfeasors would be less inclined to commit
torts if they knew that they would have to pay the entire judgment
without contribution from their cotortfeasors." 2 52 Since section 1401
does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional
wrongdoers, 253 the statute, like the 1939 Act, does not bar contribution among intentional tortfeasors. 254 Thus, New York law seems to
provide a statutory scheme adaptable to antitrust violations which
have been characterized as intentional torts. 255
2 56
Section 15-108 of the New York General Obligations Law
creates an exception to the contribution rule of section 1401 of the
CPLR to encourage settlements that would otherwise be inhibited by
the contribution rule. 257 Section 15-108 provides that "[a] release
given in good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor . .. relieves him from liability to any other person for contribution ...." 258
Without section 15-108, a settling tortfeasor who has been released

[A] right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly
and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury ... whether or
not judgment has been recovered against all or any of them. It may be enforced either in
the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution is each person's equitable share of the obligation ...
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 32 (Supp.
1979).
252. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1401, Practice Commentary C1401:1 (McKinney 1976).
253. See N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
254. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1401, Practice Commentary C1401:3 (McKinney 1976). See
also Primoffv. Duell, 85 Misc. 2d 1047, 1051, 381 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (1976) (applying § 1401 to
a fraud claim). By contrast, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act was specifically not intended to
apply to intentional torts. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, Commissioners' Comment,
reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 28 (Supp. 1979). Nevertheless, the drafters of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act noted that nothing in the Act precludes "a court [from] determining that the [comparative fault] principle should apply at common law to a case before it of an
intentional tort .. " Id.
255. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
256. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978). For a general discussion of § 15108, see Lipsig, Tort Trends-Effect of Settlement Under GOL 15-108, N.Y.L.J., April 26,
1979, at 1, col. 1.
257. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1401, Practice Commentary C1401:2 (McKinney 1976). See
also Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Packaged Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 40-41, 346 N.E.2d 520,
523-24, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (1976).
258. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(b) (McKinney 1978). The good faith requirement is
also present in the 1955 Act. See text accompanying notes 226 & 232 supra. It attempts to
ensure that the plaintiff will not release one tortfeasor "for a small sum in return for the promise
of the released tort-feasor to improperly cooperate with the injured party in an attempt to
extract from the other tort-feasors more than their equitable share of damages." J. WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN & A. MILLER, 2A N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE § 1401.21, at 14-72 (1978).
Section 6 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act is similar to § 15-108. Section 6 provides
in pertinent part that "[a] release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a
claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does
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could nonetheless be held liable for contribution. 259 Under section
15-108, however, a tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff cannot be
adjudicated liable to the plaintiff or another tortfeasor on the original
claim; any verdict rendered for the plaintiff against a second tortfeasor
does not affect the settling tortfeasor. He, so to speak, has "bought
his peace." 2 60 This section is similar to the 1955 Act, which permits
the plaintiff's release to discharge the settling tortfeasor's liability for
26
contribution. 1
Section 1402 of the CPLR 262 codifies the Dole apportionment
rule 263 as follows:
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall
be the excess paid by him over and above his equitable share of
the judgment recovered by the injured party; but no person shall
be required to contribute an amount greater than his equitable
share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance with
the relative culpability of each person liable for contribution. 264
Section 1402 is similar to section 6 of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act. 265 The comment to section 6 provides an example comparing its apportionment rule with the pro rata settlement rules of
the 1939 Act266 and 1955 Act. 267 Where tortfeasors A and B seek
contribution from tortfeasor C, who has settled and obtained a release
or a covenant not to sue from the injured party, there are three possible results:
(1) A and B are still able to obtain contribution against C, despite
the. release, (2) A and B are not entitled to contribution unless the
release was given not in good faith but by way of collusion, and (3)
the plaintiff's total claim is reduced by the proportionate share of
C. Each of the three solutions has substantial disadvantages, yet
each has been adopted in one of lsic] uniform acts. The first
solution was adopted by the 1939 Uniform Contribution Act. Its
disadvantage is that it discourages settlements; a tortfeasor has no
not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides." UNIFORM
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 34 (Supp. 1979).
259. See Impact, supra note 245, at 464.
260. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1401, Practice Commentary C1401:2 (McKinney 1976).
261. See notes 225-32 and accompanying text supra.
262, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1976).
263. Id., Practice Commentary C1402:1. See note 248 and accompanying text supra.
264. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1976).
265. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 34

(Supp. 1979). Section 6 provides in pertinent part that "the claims of the releasing person
against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable share of the
obligation .... " Id.
266. See note 217 and accompanying text supra.
267. See note 221 and accompanying text supra.
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incentive to settle if he remains liable for contribution. The second
solution was adopted by the 1955 Contribution Act. While it
theoretically encourages settlements, it may be unfair to the other
defendants and if the good-faith requirement is conscientiously enforced settlements may be discouraged.
The third solution is adopted in this Section. Although it may
have some tendency to discourage a claimant from entering into a
settlement, this solution is fairly based on the proportionate-fault

principle.

268

As two commentators have noted, section 1402 "discourages settlement by plaintiffs whose lawyers must now be certain, before settling, that a defendant is paying a sum roughly equivalent to what the
jury will ultimately determine to be his proportionate share of the
total damages. "269 Under section 1402, a plaintiff's verdict will be
reduced, not by the amount he actually received from the settling
defendant, but rather by the amount of liability which the jury later
sets for that released defendant. Consequently, a plaintiff may not
wish to settle unless he feels that he is capable of both approximating
and obtaining an amount equal to the relative culpability of the setling defendant. 270 Thus, while section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law encourages a defendant to settle by providing that a release
will terminate his involvement in the case completely, 271 section
1402 may have the opposite effect on plaintiffs.
The foregoing discussion reviews state statutes and uniform acts
in order to present the methods which have been employed to deal
with the issue of contribution in a general context. In searching for
the appropriate federal rule to govern contribution in antitrust cases,
a court would do well to consider the policies which these statutes
reflect and the analyses which they provide.
D. Proposed Federal Legislation
A uniform solution to the problem of contribution in private antitrust actions appears to be emerging from the confusion over federal

268. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, Commissioners' Comment, reprinted in 12
UNIFORM LAws ANN. 34 (Supp. 1979).
269. Impact, supra note 245, at 465. This statement was a reaction to the situation where the

plaintiff has settled with defendant-tortfeasor A for $10,000; the jury verdict against tortfeasor B
is for $50,000; and the equitable shares of A and B are 50%. The plaintiff's verdict against B will
be reduced to $25,000-B's equitable share. The plaintiff, therefore, will recover a total of
$35,000 ($10,000 from A and $25,000 from B), instead of the $50,000 to which the jury said he
was entitled. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1978).
270. See Impact, supra note 245, at 465.
271. See notes 256-61 and accompanying text supra.
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272 the criticism of the Professional Beauty decision, 273
the incipient conflicts among the federal courts concerning contribution, 274 and the absence of congressional action. In early July,
Senator Birch Bayh introduced Senate Bill 1468. 275
Senate Bill 1468 is limited in scope: it applies only to the intentional antitrust violation of price-fixing. 276 Bill 1468 adopts many of
the features of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the New York
contribution statutory scheme. 277 It permits claims for contribution
to be asserted either in the original action or in a separate action. 278
Like the 1955 Act, 279 and the New York General Obligations
Law, 280 the proposed statute provides that persons potentially liable
for price-fixing, who have received good faith releases or covenants
not to sue from the plaintiff, are relieved of liability for contribution

common law,

272.
273.
274.
275.

See notes 122-45 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 184-206 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 146-206 and accompanying text supra.
S. 1468, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. § 41 (1979). The text of the Bill is as follows:
Be itenacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
by inserting after section 4H the following new section:
"SEc. 41(a). Two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages attributable
to an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act
may claim contribution among them according to the damages attributable to each such
person's sales or purchases of goods or services. A claim for contribution by such person
or persons against whom an action has been commenced may be asserted by cross-claim,
counterclaim, third-party claim, or in a separate action, whether or not an action has been
brought or a judgment has been rendered against the persons from whom contribution is
sought.
"(b) A release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment received in
settlement by one of two or more persons subject to contribution under this section shall
not discharge any other persons from liability unless its terms expressly so provide. The
court shall reduce the claim of the person giving the release or covenant against other
persons subject to liability by the greatest of: (1) any amount stipulated by the release or
covenant, (2) the amount of consideration paid for it, or (3) treble the actual damages
attributable to the settling person's sales or purchases of goods or services. Under item (3)
above, action damages shall not be trebled in proceedings under section 4A of this Act.
"(c) A release or covenant, or an agreement which provides for a release or covenant,
entered into in good faith, relieves the recipient from liability to any other person for
contribution, with respect to the claim of the person giving the release or covenant, or
agreement, unless the settlement provided for in any such release, covenant, or agreement is not consummated.

"(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the joint and several liability of any person
who enters into an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices.
"(e) This section shall apply only to actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act
commenced after the date of enactment of this section."
276. See id. § 41(a).
277. See notes 235-71 and accompanying text supra.
278. S. 1468, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(a) (1979). Cf. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 1403 (McKinney
1.976) (identical choices granted under New York law).
279. See text accompanying note 226 supra.

280. See text accompanying note 258 supra.
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to other joint tortfeasors. 21 In addition, under the Bill, the plaintiff's claim against the nonsettling defendants would be reduced by
the greatest of three measures: 1) any amount stipulated in the release or covenant; 2) the amount of consideration paid for it; and 3)
treble the actual damages attributable to the settling person's sales or
purchases of goods or services. 282
Senate Bill 1468 has already met some opposition from the plaintiff's bar, which maintains that the contribution rule attempts to protect the small defendant who cannot afford to litigate, without considering the burden which contribution imposes upon the victim of an
antitrust violation. 283 Moreover, commentators have noted that a
right to contribution will necessarily further complicate already protracted litigation, thus, contradicting Illinois Brick's message to
simplify litigation. 284 Even the United States Attorney General's office, although generally favoring the Bill, queries whether contribution should be generally applicable to intentional antitrust misconduct, 285 and raises many questions concerning: 1) the type of conduct
for which contribution should be allowed; 2) how defendants' contribution shares should be determined; 3) how to handle settlements;
4) the procedures for claiming contribution; and 5) whether a statute
allowing contribution should deal with such specific issues or leave
them to the courts. 286
Senate Bill 1468 is likely to see much debate and change before
its final passage. Despite its limited scope and its endorsement of
contribution, a statutory rule denying contribution in the settlement
context should be welcomed by courts as a uniform and proper approach. 287 The congressional attention given Senate Bill 1468 could
precipitate the passage of a broader statute, and save the Supreme

281. See S. 1468, 96 Cong., IstSess. § 41(c) (1979).
282. Id. § 41(b). For other approaches used in determining the measure of a nonsettling
defendant's liability, see note 183 supra.
283. Axinn, Antitrust Legislation by 96th Congress,. N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1979, at 1, col. 2.

284. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977); notes 167-68 and accompanying text supra. See also Brown, Franchising-Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, N.Y.L.J.,
July 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
285. 1979 Hearings, supra note 181, at 1, 13 (commenting on the predecessor to S. 1468).
286. Id. at 8-9.
287. It is to be expected that alternatives to Senate Bill 1468 will be forthcoming. A recent
article, for example, suggests abolishing joint liability in antitrust cases instead of granting a

right to contribution. See Izard & Miller, High Price-FixingAwards Require Abolition of Joint,
Several Liability, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 22, col. 1. Critical of the no-contribution rule,
the authors think abolition of joint liability to be the appropriate remedy because it would
insure that "each conspirator would be responsible for only three times the benefit derived from
its own misconduct." Id. at 23, col. 2.
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Court from its otherwise inevitable task of deciding the law of antitrust contribution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Federal law appears to govern antitrust contribution quesOnly one federal court to date has applied state law, 289
288
and its reasoning is not compelling. 290 The probability of
nonuniform decisional law among the states provides a persuasive policy against the application of state law to contribution in federal antitrust cases.
Assuming federal common law governs, federal courts may continue to apply the traditional federal common law, which prohibits
contribution for intentional antitrust violations, or they may develop a
new rule either by adopting state contribution law or by creating new
doctrine. While most states allow some type of contribution, only a
minority of states permit a nonsettling defendant to claim contribution from a settling and released defendant, primarily because settlement would otherwise be discouraged. In the area of antitrust violations where a strong public policy favors settlement, there is little
basis for a rule permitting contribution from settling defendants.
The recent decision of the Eighth Circuit in Professional Beauty,
however, reversed the traditional rule and permitted contribution
among intentional violators of the antitrust laws. Since the rights of
nonsettling defendants were not in issue in Professional Beauty, since
subsequent district court opinions have narrowed and distinguished
the case, 291 and since proposed legislation will deny contribution in
the settlement context, 292 it is hoped that, in the future, federal
courts will not permit contribution in antitrust cases involving settling
defendants.*
tions.

288. See notes 24-102 and accompanying text supra.
289. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956).
290. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text supra.
291. See notes 184-206 and accompanying text supra.
292. See notes 272-87 and accompanying text supra.
* Editors Note: As this article went to print, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit announced its decision in Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 936
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (Oct. 25, 1979); cited as pending note 53 supra.
Expressly rejecting the analysis of the Eighth Circuit in Professional Beauty, the court held that
there is no right to contribution under the federal antitrust laws. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) at F-1.
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